本帖最后由 一啸长天 于 2009-9-22 10:31 编辑
VIII.
Wrong-headed about “resistance”
Right up there with inappropriate borrowing from psychology is the construct of resistance to change. I have commented, above, that at the SEI we believed that any person who resisted our forceful sales job on soft¬ware process improvement had a bad character, and was disloyal, unpatriotic. I have come to learn that some of the resistance was appropriate, and some was about the mortgage.
知道有从心理学(这是当前的状况)里不适当的引用用以变革。我已发出评论,上面提到过,就是在SEI里,我们相信任何一个阻碍我们在软件过程改进方面强劲的销售工作的人有着比较坏的个性,并且不忠诚,不爱国。我逐渐了解到有些阻力是合理的,有些则是精神负担。
The “mortgage” angle is simply this: if you reduce my ability to meet my mortgage payments then expect me to respond – negatively, as you might imagine. The application to SPI is simple: if software process im¬provement will make me look stupid, incompetent, or otherwise less powerful than the position I have strug¬gled lo these many years to earn, then you can count me as against it. Does this mean that the person in question, and incidentally, in authority, is resistant? I don’t think so, I think the person is acting appropriately to proximately protect his/her mortgage payments.
从按揭角度简单的讲:如果你削减我对我的按揭支付能力,然后又期待着我给予响应——这是不可能的,你也想得到的。对于SPI的应用是简单的:如果软件过程改进使得我烦起来很傻帽、无能、或已这些年的经验也无法应对,那么你可以想得到我是一定会反对它的。这意味着此人有问题吗,顺便说一句,因为实在权威领域,所以是阻力吗?我不这么认为,我倒认为此人正在近似完美化他的按揭。
A. Competency-enhancing vs. competency-destroying
A.能力提升 VS 能力消亡
How did I come to this line of reasoning? One brick is (Tushman & Anderson, Technological Discontinuities and Organizational Environments, September 1986). In this seminal article, the authors investigate how it is that some firms make technological changes and thrive, and others do not and perish. They find that at least in part it’s the technology! They classify the technologies – and this is their contribution – as either compe¬tency-enhancing or competency-destroying. Competency-enhancing technology performs functions you do today, just better, cheaper, and/or faster. Competency-destroying technology performs functions you have probably never performed, such as object-oriented design or Java programming or, well, software process improvement. The authors found that those firms that m a d e successful technological transitions time and time-again differentiated how they implemented competency-enhancing technology vs. competency-destroying. For competency-enhancing, a few hours of instruction ( a t most) may be sufficient, as are on-line help, FAQs, and tutorials. For competency-destroying technologies, though, an entirely different approach needs to be taken, else those affected will try to protect their mortgages (not quite the way they put it) and will not learn the new stuff.
为何我会这样推理?这得提及(Tushman & Anderson, Technological Discontinuities and Organizational Environments, September 1986)。在这个有生命力的文章里,一些公司如何做出技术上的改变并且兴旺起来,而另一些没有这样做,以至于最后落得衰败的下场。他们发现这至少是技术!他们见这些技术分类——这就是他们的贡献——或者能力提升,或者能力消亡。能力提升的技术执行着你如今做的、仅是更好、更便宜、以及或更快速的功能。能力消亡的技术执行着你也许永远都不会用到的、就像面向对象设计或Java编程或,软件过程改进。那些作者发现:那些能成功的进行一次又一次的技术过渡区别于那些能力消亡的是他们执行能力提升的技术。对于能力提升,几小时的指导业余就已足够,因为都是一些在线帮助、FAQs 及指导。对于能力消亡的技术,尽管、一个完全不同的方法需要被执行,或许这些影响会试着保护他们的按揭(也不完全是他们放出的)而且不会学习新的东西。
It bears mentioning that the world advances by competency-destroying technologies, so we need to learn how to implement them. Tushman has m a d e something of a career of exploring this, beginning with his dis¬covery in his first article, above, through to his latest book, (Tushman & O'Reilly III, Winning Through Innova¬tion: a Practical Guide to Leading Organizational Change and Renewal, 1997). For those who are patience-impaired, that book is well-redacted in (Tushman, Anderson, & O'Reilly, Levers for Organizational Renewal: Innovation Streams, Ambidextrous Organizations, and Strategic Change, 1998). If one follows the writings of Tushman through his odyssey, one will see a transformation of his. He has come to see that in order to be effective, organizations have to be equally adroit at (discovering and) implementing competency-enhancing and competency-destroying technologies simultaneously. He sees cycles of rapid change where discontinuous, competency-destroying innovation is prevalent, followed by relatively stable epochs of incremental improvement and competency-enhancing technologies, followed by the tumult of discontinuous change and its white-water characteristics, and so on.
不得不提及一点:我们的世界就是靠这些能力消亡的技术得以提升的,因此我们不得不学习如何实现他们。Tushman已经对此进行了职业探索,是以他的第一篇论文而开始的,如上,贯穿于他最新的书中(Tushman & O'Reilly III, Winning Through Innova¬tion: a Practical Guide to Leading Organizational Change and Renewal, 1997)。因为那些都是病态的修复,这本(Tushman, Anderson, & O'Reilly, Levers for Organizational Renewal: Innovation Streams, Ambidextrous Organizations, and Strategic Change, 1998)对此作出了很好的编辑。如果有人能跟着Tushman 进场其研究所写的不发前进,他将会看见一个质的变化。他会慢慢明白什么是有效的,组织不得不同时同样熟于执行能力提升和能力消技术。他会看到断断续续得快数周期性变化,能力消亡创新是很普遍的,接着就是步改善及能力提升的技术的稳定期,再就是不连续改变的骚动期及他的把开水似的特性,等等。
B. Life cycles B.生命周期
The idea that organizations have life cycles and that different skills might be appropriate and required during each one is most prominently due to (Quinn, Beyond Rational Management: Mastering the Paradoxes and Competing Demands of High Performance, 1988). Quinn posits that every organization goes through four sequential cycles:
1. Innovating, inventing whatever the new enterprise’s value proposition will be.
2. Discovering that people are its most important assets.
3. Integrating robust processes into its business life so that it can repeatably address the issues of the mar¬ketplace.
4. Developing a strategy that will insure that the enterprise will survive and flourish.
This work, incidentally, is an application of Parson’s General Theory of Action; the insightful student will be able to identify the AGIL framework, in order!
其思想就是:组织都是有生命周期的并且不同的技能可能在每一个阶段适用并且需要,这得归因于(Quinn, Beyond Rational Management: Mastering the Paradoxes and Competing Demands of High Performance, 1988)Quinn指出每一个组织都有这四个连续的周期:
1. 创新、发明那些只要是企业提出的新提议
2. 发现人才是最重要的资产
3. 集成健壮的过程到商业活动中,以此可重复的抓住市场的脉搏。
4. 研制出一种策略来确保企业存活并兴旺。
这个工作,顺便提一句,是Parson的普遍行为理论;有洞察力的学者能够鉴别AGIL构架,如按顺序的话!
Quinn posits, in addition, that for each phase a different set of skills are appropriate and the expression of them is a kind of balancing among competing values. The SPI angle is that we typically act as though we are in the third phase when there’s a ¾ chance that we are not! We have to learn how to act in the other three phases and Quinn’s book is an excellent guide. For more detailed guidance one can consult (Quinn, Becom¬ing a Master Manager: a Competency Framework, 1990).
Quinn提出,附加一点,为每一个阶段设立不同的技能是比较合适的而且它们的表述是一种介于计算价值的平衡。SPI的观点是如果我们按照典型的进行,那么即使我们处于第三阶段,我们那时也不会有3/4的机会!我们必须学会如何处理好其它3各阶段,Quinn的书是一个不错的指南。想要得到更具体的指导可以查阅(Quinn, Becom¬ ing a Master Manager: a Competency Framework, 1990)。
Therefore, the existence of life cycles also implies another reason that the concept of “resistance” may be wrong-headed: SPI may be inappropriate in several of the phases, or at least less valuable than in the third, when it would be wildly important.
因此生命周期的存在也暗示另外一个原因,那就是“阻力”这一概念也许是错误的:SPI也许不适合这三个阶段,或者与第三个相比较起来没什么价值,当它很重要的时候。
C. Strategy C. 战略
And here is just a quick reminder about a point m a d e in section V. Sometimes it is appropriate to “resist” the proposed changes because they are inconsistent with the organizational strategy. In the case of SPI, the CMM is targeted at operational excellence. If your organization’s strategy is either product innovativeness or customer intimacy, then you’d better use the CMM to bring up the organization to a threshold of operational excellence. Any more than that should be resisted on strategy grounds.
并且要有一个迅速的提醒,是关于在第五章提出的一点。有时这比较适用于“抵制”被提议的改变,因为它们不符合企业的战略。在SPI的一个案例中,CMM致力于操作上的卓越。如果你的组织的战略或者是产品创新或者是客户亲密度,那么你最好使用CMM来帮助提升组织卓越操作的阀值。除此之外的应该受制于战略范围。
D. Institutionalization D. 制度化
One of the life cycles of change used by the SEI uses the term “institutionalization” in it and the SEI adopted that term for the CMMs. The term institutionalization has, unfortunately for the SEI, numerous meanings, including:
1. Civil confinement of individuals for mental health or community safety reasons.
2. The habit of an organization to repeat what it knows and to imitate others it admires.
The SEI means it in the sense of adoption, as in section VI.A, the way Ev Rogers defined it as “regular usage.”
由SEI使用的一种生命周期的变化是用术语“制度化”在其中,并且SEI是基于CMMs而采用这个术语的。
1. 有礼貌的个人限制是为了精神健康或社区安全的原因。
2. 组织的习惯是重复他已经知道的并且模仿那些它们所钦佩的。
SEI意味着从采纳的用意上看,在VI.A中提到过,Ev Rogers 定义它为“有规律的使用”
But institutionalization as sociologists use the term (2., above) is important, too. Just look at the title of the seminal article on the subject, (DiMaggio & Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, April 1983). “The Iron Cage”! Iron cage is the literary term for prison. Max Weber, one of the most famous sociologists, wrote: "… the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the ‘saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment.’ But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage." DiMaggio and Powell write that by this Weber warned that rationalism had ushered in an era in which capitalism and its off-spring, bureauc¬racy, had become an iron cage for humanity (p. 147). The authors note the strong resemblance of organiza¬tional structure from one organization to another, not withstanding their disparate market orienta¬tions, such as Microsoft and Ford Motor Company, for example. That is, the organization charts of those two firms are nearly identical at some scale.
但是作为社会学家使用社会化这个术语(上面第二点)也是很重要的。只是看看基于这一主题的有着生命力的文章的标题,(DiMaggio & Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, April 1983)“铁笼”!铁笼是监狱的文学术语。Max Weber,最著名的社会学家之一,曾写到:“……想要保护外部的商品应该仅能依靠像‘轻轻的外衣,可以随时被甩到一边的圣徒’。但是命运的判决使得这件外衣可能变为铁笼。”DiMaggio 和Powell 写道,通过Weber的警告,理想主义 己经在一个在官僚主义及其后期的纪元里占领风骚,这就对人类来说已经变为一个铁笼。一些作者发现在组织之间有强烈的相似之处,这里不是来对比它们在市场面向上的不同,举个例子,就像微软和福特汽车公司。也就是说,这两家公司的组织图表在某种范围内是极其相似的。
What accounts for the lack of diversity in organizational life when organizations themselves – from the standpoint of the diversity of the people in them and the diversity of their markets and market disciplines – seem so diverse? It’s that organizations copy one another and there is great pressure to look and act alike, the authors show. They use the sociologist’s term for this pressure: institutionalization. The main point of the lit¬erature on institutionalization is what a strong, pervasive, and latent force it is. Organizations may not so much resist change, rather they conform to very large, powerful norms.
是什么原因导致组织生命里如此缺乏多样性,当组织它们自己——从在他们看来的人们多样化的立场及它们市场的多样化和市场规则——看似如此多样化?这是那些组织对另外一个的拷贝,就有很大的压力(因为所观察及行为上都很相似),那些作家指出。他们使用社会学家的述语来阐述这种压力:制度化。基于制度化的最主要的一点是什么是强大的、普遍的、潜在的力量。那些组织可能不怎么强烈抵制变革,这使得它们更符合大型的、强劲的代名词。
E. What can be changed E. 什么能被改变
While I do not like using psychological constructs, it might be instructive to look at a few, and leave as an open question about whether organizations act like people in this regard. First, the addiction literature notes that back-sliding (that is, failing to make a permanent change, called “relapse” in the model) is normal and part of the life cycle of improvement (see esp. (Miller & Rollnick, Motivational Interviewing: Preparing People to Change Addictive Behavior, 1991), p. 15, Fig. 2.1, citing the six stages of change by (Prochaska & DiClemente, Transtheoretical Therapy: Toward a More Integrative Model of Change, 1982)). Second, (Seligman, What You Can Change & What You Can't: the Complete Guide to Successful Self-Improvement, 1994), summarizes his 250-page synopsis of psychology by listing behaviors and correspondingly the chance of changing. The list goes from curable, through mild or moderate relief, to unchangeable. The pattern that emerges from the list is that what can change is a function of how deep the behavior is. Depth is elusive and difficult to define, but intuitively ranges from biological “destiny,” which is the hardest to change, to how strongly we believe something, which is the easiest to change because, in some circumstances we can apply logic (or cognitive therapy, which is currently popular).
当我不喜欢使用心理学的构想时,可能有些得益于看了一点,这就留给我们一个开放性的问题:在所关心的事物的层面上,组织的行为和人们的是相似的。第一,成瘾文学中指出,倒退(也就是,没能成功做出持久化改变,在模型里称之为“旧病复发”)是正常的,并且改进的生命周期里的部分也是如此(see esp.(Miller & Rollnick, Motivational Interviewing: Preparing People to Change Addictive Behavior, 1991),第15页,图2.1引证了变革的六个阶段(Prochaska & DiClemente, Transtheoretical Therapy: Toward a More Integrative Model of Change, 1982))。第二,(Seligman, What You Can Change & What You Can't: the Complete Guide to Successful Self-Improvement,1994),概括了他的250页心理学的大意,通过列举出一些行为和相应的变革和机会。这份表单遵循的是可治愈的,从温和的、适量的减轻,到完全没有变化。从这份表单出浮现的模式是什么能被改变是一个如何深化行为的功能点。深化是难以理解的也很难定义,但是直观的从生物学的“定数”(就是那种最难改变的东西)来看,如何强化我们对某些东西的信念,这是最容易改变的,因为在某些特定环境下,我们应用推理的方法(或者认知论,这是当前流行的。)
(Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 1992) generalizes the psychology literature and theorizes that organizational “culture” is manifest on three levels:
1. Artifacts – things that we can see and read, the surface, visible.
2. Espoused values – what is said to be believed, such as strategies, goals, philosophies.
3. Basic underlying assumptions – latent, not spoken, understood, unconscious, taken for granted, the ultimate source of values and actions.
The order is from easiest to change to most difficult.
(Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 1992)概括了心理学文献和理论,组织“文化”主要体现在三个级别上:
1. 人工制品——一些我们能看到、阅读、表负,可视。
2. 信奉价值——可以相信些什么,就像战略、目标、哲学
3. 基本的一些潜在的假设——潜在的、不能言表的、可理解、未发觉的、想当然、价值和行动的最终来源。
这里的顺序是从最容易的到最难的。
Is a person or organization being resistant if it is asked to change that which is very difficult to change? Do we even have a right to ask for such a change? Do we know where software process improvement is in the spectrum of what is possible to change?
如果被要求变革,有人或组织就会抵制吗,这会很艰难的变革吗?我们甚至会有权限来要求做出这样的变革吗?我们知道在什么样的范围里可能进行软件过程改进吗?
F. Language as inhibitor or accelerator 语言就像刹车或加速器
Along the lines of cognitive therapy are the ideas in (Kegan & Lahey, How the Way We Talk Can Change the Way We Work: Seven Languages for Transformation, 2001), redacted in (Kegan & Lahey, The Real Reason People Won't Change, November 2001). The distinguished authors note that we construct our own iron cage with the language we use for change. They take us step-by-step away from the language that silently removes change from our consideration and towards language that commits us to consider change. The work is artful in that we are not m a d e aware of the deep psychological basis for our antipathy towards change, but are led to learn a new way to frame the choice to change that appears to be as natural as the one to avoid it.
按照认知疗法的思想很多都有在(Kegan & Lahey, How the Way We Talk Can Change the Way We Work: Seven Languages for Transformation, 2001),也存在于(Kegan & Lahey, The Real Reason People Won't Change, November 2001)。一些著名的作者指出我们为了变革使用语言,自己创建了铁笼。他们引领我们一步一步地远离将潜移默化地从我们变革的考虑移除的语言并且朝向能帮助我们变革的语言走去。这项工作是很技巧性的,因为我们反感变革
G. Change is harder than we think 变革比我们相像中难得多
To me, this section, along with other information, implies that change is more difficult than we think. In fact, it might be a lot more difficult than we think. After all, how is change measured? We don’t have a change effort metric and there is virtually nothing written about how difficult it is quantitatively for a person or an organization to change. I take this to mean that we know very little about the effort it takes to change and whether that energy is justified, so it is cheap to require change, as we have done at the SEI for a long time.
对我来说,这一部分,加上其它的一些信息,暗示了变革是比我们相像中难得多。事实上,它可能比我们相像的难上许多。毕竟,变革如何被度量的?我们还没有一个变革的有交度量标准,并且几乎没有书面性的东西来说明它对于一个组织或个人进行变革在分量上有多难。说这些是为了指出对于它能带来的变革我们所知甚微,并且这种能力是不是合理的,因此这对需要变革来说是比较廉价的,正如我们在SEI里花了那么长时间所做的工作一样。
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译者权归“思步网(www.step365.com)”及版主“一啸长天”共同所有,未经许可,请勿转载
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