[连载]SEPG行为指南(这事我做,会有什么不同呢)

一啸长天

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What I would do differently if I wrote the SEPG Guide today

如果现在我来写SEPG指南的话

我的做法会有哪些不同呢？

Stan Rifkin

Master Systems Inc.

2604B El Camino Real #244
Carlsbad, California 92008 USA
Phone: +1 760 729 3388
E-mail: sr@Master-Systems.com

© Copyright by Master Systems Inc.

Abstract. The Software Engineering Process Group Guide (SEPG Guide) was researched and written by Priscilla Fowler and Stan Rifkin in 1988-1990, and published by the Software Engineering Institute in 1990. It is about how to improve processes every day. Many of the observations reported in it have proved useful over the years of application. Some additional information would have added significantly to its applicabil ity, particularly (not in any order): one size does not fit all, the importance of process improvement by stealth, how we are misled by psychology and should pay attention to sociology, what patterns of adoption look like, a fresh look at “resistance,” and how engineers might approach the subject of deployment.

摘要：GEPG指南(软件工程过程组指南)是经由Priscilla Fowler 和 Stan Rifkin 于1998－1990年间研究所著的，并于1990年由SEI（卡内基·梅隆大学软件工程研究所）出版。它是关于如何在每一天提升改进。很多观察指出它对近些年的应用是很有用的。另外，还有一些信息应该己经加入它的可应用性中，特别是（不以任何顺序来述说）：没有万能的钥匙，过程改进的重要性悄然地进行着，我们是如何被心理学所误导且应该留意于社会学，采用什么样的模式看起来像重新审视“阻力”一词了，工程师们是如何来靠近部署的主题的。

                 Table of Contents

         I. Introduction
        II. Positives
        III. Negatives
        IV. Means to evaluate suggestions
         V. Too much “one size fits all”
        VI. Not enough about patterns of adoption
      VII. Too much psychology, not enough sociology
     VIII. Wrong-headed about “resistance”
       IX. Insufficient pointers for engineers entering new subject areas
        X. Understanding negotiations
       XI. What we know & what we don’t
      XII. In conclusion
     XIII. Acknowledgments
     XIV. References

                                                  目录
            I． 简介
          II． 何为正确
         III． 何为错误
         IV． 通过些许手段来评估建议
          V． 太多的“万能钥匙了”了
         VI． 对于采用何种模式没有充分地了解
        VII． 过多注重心理学，而忽视了社会学
       VIII． 关于“阻力”的错误
         IX． 没有足够的动力来驱使工程师们进入一些崭新的领域
          X． 了解协商
         XI．   什么我们知道，什么不知道
        XII． 总结
       XIII． 感谢
       XIV． 引用资料简介

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一啸长天

I. Introduction

A. Purpose
I am frequently asked whether the SEPG Guide still applies to modern-day software process improvement. After all, it was written over ten years ago! The answer is that I have learned a lot since its publication and this essay is a chronicle of my journey; it is something of an autobiography.
The purpose is to introduce users of the Guide to some of the ideas that didn’t make it into the Guide, but should have. Many were known at the time of writing, but some were not. And almost none were known to us, the co-authors, at the time, so the ideas in this essay represent true learning – at least for us.

Another purpose of this essay is to prod and provoke, and for that reason I exaggerate in places. I learn by being challenged and I hope you do, too.

I．简介
A. 目的
我常想为什么SEPG指南仍然应用于当今的软件过程改进中。毕竟它是在十年前写的东西啊！答案就是它一出版我就己经了解很多并且这篇论文是我的旅程的一个记录；有点儿像自传吧。

目的是给这个指南的使用者们一些思路，这些是没有被记入指南中的，但是应该有的一部分！参与编写的的很多人是被大家熟知的，有一些则不是。并且几乎没有人知道我们，协助他们的作者，因此这篇论文里的思想代表着真实的学习－至少对于我们来说是这样的

B. Background   B.背景
When I joined the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) in 1988 I was instantly asked by Priscilla Fowler whether I would be willing to write a section on action planning in a technical report she and Steve Masters were writing. She and Steve Masters had begun to write a survey of best practices on how to implement software process im¬provement (SPI). The notion was that there should be a focal point for software process improvement, called a software engineering process group (SEPG), that, while not responsible for process improvement, would be the collector and disseminator of SPI technology and on how to implement, deploy, and transition SPI into practice.

当我于1988年加入SEI时，Priscilla Fowler就问我是否愿意参与一个关于行动计划的技术报告里一部分内容的编写，而这个报告Steve Masters和她正在编写。她和Steve Masters己经开始写关于如何实施SPI（软件过程改进）的最有效的实践的调查报告。这个概念就是对于软件过程应该有一个焦点，即：SEPG，不代表着过程改进，只是SPI技术的收集者和散播者及如何实现，部署及将SIP应用于实践中。

The inspiration for the survey was Chapter 14, “The Software Engineering Process Group,” in Watts Hum¬phrey’s seminal Managing the Software Process (Addison-Wesley, 1989). It was part of that early defini¬tion of process maturity level 3, the defined process level. Mr. Humphrey outlined the tasks of the SEPG, so our job was to add a best practices survey of “how.”

这份调查报告的灵感来自于Watts Hum¬phrey的《软件过程管理》（Addison-Wesley, 1989）的 第14章“软件工程过程改进组”。它是早期的过程3级成熟度的一部分，界定过程级别。Humphrey先生描述了SEPG的种种任务，因此我们的工作就是为其加入关于“如何”这一部分的最有效的实践调查报告。

Priscilla, Steve, and I often discussed the outline and approach for writing the work. We wanted to closely follow the outline of the duties that Watts had presented in his book. Our focus on the “how” would balance Watts’  on the “what.” Accordingly, we ended up doing what very few at the SEI did at the time: leave the building to survey how actual process champions achieved their objectives. We interviewed a number of such champions, mostly in commercial firms. We could see two things: there were patterns, and there was a lot to learn for those of us who were not professional champions or change agents.

Priscilla,Steve和我时常探讨写这部作品的大纲和方法。我们想紧紧依照Wats在他的这本书中的责任的大纲。我们着力于“如何做”这点以平衡于Watts的“做什么”。因此，在当时最后我们在SEI做得很少的是：离开这栋楼去调查实际的过程“冠军”是如何达到他们的目标的。我们采房了很多类似的“冠军”，基本上都是在一些商业公司里。我们能看出两样东西：有各种模式，还有很多东西对我们这种非专业队或变革代理人是需要大量学习的。

We surveyed and wrote from 1988 through 1990. The review process at the SEI results in much written material not being published; that is, it ends up on the ”cutting room floor.” One question we had at the out¬set was whether we had    m a d e   the right decisions about what to include and exclude. The test of time is upon us and this essay reports on my professional observations since the SEPG Guide was published.
我们从1988至1990年调查并编写SEPG。在SEI的复审过程使得大量书面材料在当时没有被出版；也就是说它最终像是“被剪辑过的电影”一样结束。有一个问题就是起初我们关于什么应该包括，什么应该删除是否做了正确的决策。时否经得起时间的测试完全取决于我们及自从SEPG指南出版后并基于我的职业观察后的这篇论文。

Incidentally, I    m a d e     an important mistake at the outset. In my zeal I did not notice that the section should have been entitled “Action,” not “Action Planning.” We are fine at plan¬ning, it’s just that we often fail to take action.

顺便提一句，我起初犯一个很严重的错误。我没有注意到这部分应该以“行动”为标题，而非“行动计划”。我们都擅于计划，这也正是我们时常在行动方面失败。
The SEPG Guide is available for free download as SEI 90-TR-24, September 1990.

SEPG指南可以在以下站点免费获取。

http://www.sei.cmu.edu/publicati ... orts/90.tr.024.html

I shall assume that the reader is familiar with the work.
我应当假设一下：读者是熟悉这项工作的。

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一啸长天

II.        Positives



We felt that there was already enough written about process improvement at the SEI that was directive, pre¬scriptive, normative. Besides, we could find little authority that guided the efforts that we observed in the field. Accordingly, we sought to be true to the spirit of a survey and write something without shoulds.

当时在SEI里，我们感觉己经完全具备编写过程改进的能力，使其可指导、可规范、可标准化。此外，我们几乎找不到这方面的权威来指导工作。因此，我们是本着求真的精神来做这项调查的，且不能写些什么“应该”是的东西。

What we saw in the field was an emphasis on soft skills, that is, on dealing with humans and organizations. And we saw in every case a boundary spanner, someone who lived in two worlds, the world of software technology and in the world of helping people to change. By definition, incidentally, boundary spanners are marginal in both. And they are rare.

我们在这个领域里所看的是强调软技术，即着手于人和组织的。我们还在每一个项目里看到一个活在两个世界里的边界管理者（boundary spanner 在组织沟通方面发挥着控制. 信息的重要功能），一个就是软件技术的世界，另一个即是帮助人们改变的世界。就定义来看，附带地提一提，边界管理者是这两个世界的边缘的，且这类人很少。

We collected in one place what we could not find hitherto ourselves, so we knew it would be useful to change agents going forward.

我们在一个地方收集到今我们还未能找到的东西，因此我们相信它对于使代理商们向前发展是会有用的。

The emphasis on reporting what we saw, on soft skills, and on trying to add value by bringing together in one place a collection of tips    m a d e   us focus on being practical and applied, in order to produce something SEPG members could use every day.

重点在于描述我们看到了什么，关于软技能和尝试通过汇集到一处增加价值   收集技巧使得我们专注于实践和应用， 为了产出些什么以供SEPG成员日常使用。

And last, we tried to supply pointers to additional resources that had helped us. That way users of the Guide could expand on what we had observed and develop greater understanding than we had.

最后，我们尝试为曾提供过我们帮助的人们一些指导。这样，这本指南的用户就可以扩展我们己经发现的东西还可以延伸出超出我们己有的更好的想法来。


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一啸长天

III.        Negatives


Probably the biggest fault with our work, one that we did not really realize at the time, was the need to have a way to evaluate suggestions, ours and those that we heard during the survey and later on. We believed all that we heard and read. We did not have a filter, a way of organizing or evaluating the information we gath¬ered.

我们工作中最大的错误可能是，需要找出评估建议（我们的及一些我们后来在调查中听到的）的手段，而这个我们当时还没有真正地了解。我们相信了所有我们听到的和读到的。我们没有一个能组织或评估我们所收集的信息的方法的“过滤器”。

As much as we tried to be practical and not directive, in retrospect we had too much “one size fits all（一刀切）.” This reflected the mood of the SEI at the time and we fell victim to it. Various people, most notably Dave Card, tried to dissuade us from its force, but we were too easily influenced by the Zeitgeist.

我们所做的一切是至力于实践的，而非指导性的。回顾过去，我们有太多的“万能钥匙”了。这也反映出当时SEI的情况，且我们也是它的受害者。各种各样的人，特别是Dave Card 曾试着劝阻我们不要着了它的道，但是我们太容易被时代思想所迷惑。

Also, we were not mature enough to see the bigger patterns of adoption that we were hearing about. In a word, we had not read and understood (Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 1995) (it was in its third edition then). And (Moore, Crossing the Chasm: Marketing and Selling Technology Products to Mainstream Custom¬ers, 1991) had just come along, after the Guide was published.

同样地，我们没有成熟到可以完全理解我们所听到的被采用的更大的模式。总而言之，我们没有阅读并理解Rogers于1995年出版的《新产品渗透理论》，那时还是第三版。还有Moore于1991年出版的《跨越鸿沟：营销和销售技术产品给主流客户》是在SEGP指南一出版后，马上就面市的。

There is something that draws us engineers  and computer professionals to psychology. But, in order to deal with groups, we should have learned sociology. We have over-relied on psychology, to our detriment. One negative, then, is that we did not introduce the operative learnings from sociology.

有一些东西吸引着我们的工程师和计算机专业人员们倾向于心理学。但是为了和团队打交道，我们应该己经明白了社会学吧。我们己太过于依赖于心理学来帮助我们决策。错误就在于我们没有从社会学方面来介绍有效的学习。

There was a widespread feeling at the SEI at the time of writing the Guide that we all resist change and that this resistance requires a strong counterforce. I have come to think that we were wrong-headed about resis¬tance and have done a disservice to our readers and practitioners. Sometimes resistance is the appropriate response to change.

那时我们在SEI从事SEPG的编写的人有着一个广泛的同识：我们都在抵制着改变，这一阻力需要一个强大的反作用力。我们开始认为我们这样抵制是错误的并且己经对我们的读者和从业者造成了一定的伤害。有时，抵制是对于改变较适合的回应了。

We also did not provide enough pointers into the literature of planning and managing change for engineers and computer professionals. There was much that we could have pointed to that would have sped up learn¬ing for those of us with hard science backgrounds.

我们也没有为工程师和计算机专业人员们在计划和管理改变的文献中提供足够的指导。有很多我们己经指出：对于我们这些有着硬科学（自然科学学科）背景的人来说，应该加快学习的步伐。

We also underrated the place of negotiations and how much SEPG members needed to know about how to conduct them. I don’t think we even mentioned the topic, but many SEPG members find themselves having to balance competing interests all the time, so being well versed and well practiced in the science and art of negotiation is important.

我也们低估了谈判地点并且有多少SEPG成员需要知道如何去控制它们。我不认为我提及主题，但是很多SEPG成员发现他们始终在相互的利益之间求取平衡，因此对科学而又艺术的商谈很明了并多多实践是相当重要的。

And last, we should have listed what we knew and what we didn’t, so that users of the Guide could be on the lookout for what were truly new developments, and not have to re-warm what was already known. We should have helped create a curiosity about the important aspects of implementing SPI that are not yet decided. Sometimes at SEPG Conferences, for example, we hear as new something that has been known all along.

最后，我们应当列举出我们所知和未知的东西，如此一来，SEPG指南的使用者能把精力集中到寻求真正的新发展中，而不是还得重温己知的东西。我们应该帮助大家在实施SPI的重要性方面建立起好奇心，但是还未能定音。举个例子，有时在SEPG的会议上，我们听到的以为是新的东西却己长久存在了。

The organization of the essay is that each of the following sections deals in turn with an improvement we should have    m a d e   , in the order of the items listed above. In a real new version of the SEPG Guide each of the sections would be chapters, with more detail and less autobiography.

本文的组织是这样的：对于以下的每一个部分都与我们应该进行的实践相关，它们与我们前面所例举的内容是一一对应的。SEGP指南的真正新版本，它的每一部分应当成为一个章节，且有着更多的细节描述及更少的无边之谈。


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一啸长天

IV.        
Means to evaluate suggestions



“There is nothing quite a practical as a good theory.” – Kurt Lewin

Do you believe everything you read? Why not? The usual reason is that there is something contradictory in it. For example, when a salesperson says, “I exist only to serve you,” we might not believe that because we have previous information about rewards. Or, “I can be objective about the solution to your software man¬agement and development problems,” said by an SEPG member! We have reason to doubt this, as any SEPG member would have a bias about the solution, and that would interfere with the perception of the problem.

你相信你读的每本书吗？为什么不呢？通常的原因是在里面或多或少有一些令你感到矛盾的地方。举个例子，当一个售货员说：“我的存是只是为了服务您。”我们可能不会相信，因为我们有以往的经验教训。或者，“我能很客观地解决你的管理和开发的问题。”一个SEPG成员的声音！我们有理由去怀疑它，要知道任何一个SEPG的成员可能对这个解决方案抱有偏见，这可能会妨碍对这个问题的理解。

But when we read a book or article the author’s biases might not be evident. How do we know whether we should take the advice being offered? The short answer is that if I can find the theory that supports what is being said, then I can evaluate the advice by comparing the underlying theory with the theory I hold about the world. If the theories match, then I am inclined to believe the story (= advice).

当是当我们读一本书或是文章的时候，作者的偏见也许不是很明显。那我们怎么知道是否应该接受这个建议呢？简而言之，如果我能找出一种理论来支持它所说的，那么我就能通过我对这个世界所持有的理论与它潜在的理论来对比。如果它们相匹配，我就倾向于相信这个建议了。

We all have theories, whether we articulate them or not. We use them to screen what perceptions we let im¬pact us (some of us do not see “flying saucers,” for example), how we make sense of the perceptions, and how things tie together into something that is useful for us. Theories are the induction we make in light of our experience. They contain the patterns we have sensed, but in a shorthand, an abbreviation, a generaliza¬tion.

我们都有一套理论，只是看能否将其阐明清楚。我们用它来明确我们的信念（例如，我们中有些人不相信“飞碟”）我们如何理解这这些认知及事物如何联系在一起以形成其它对于我们来说会有用的东西。理论都是我们经验的种种映像。它们囊括了我们所感知的，只是被速写、缩写、一般化罢了。

There are many useful synonyms or terms related to theory: paradigm, world view, model, framework, lens, and school of thought. The words and phrases are defined and differentiated in more precise terms in (Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1970) and (Burrell & Morgan, Sociological Paradigms and Organisa¬tional Analysis : Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life, 1979). The picture I have of theory is:

有很多的同义词或术语与这个理论相关：范例、世界观、模型、构架、透镜、学派。这些词或短语在Kuhn在1970年出版的《科学变革的结构》和Burrell & Morgan 在1979年出片的《社会范式与组织分析：企业生命之社会无素》中被冠以更准确的述语加以定义和区分。关于此理论的图片如下：
                        
                  Figure 1 – The flow of theory to action.

The intuition is this: I have a theory that is “floating” around in my mind and I write it down in some abstract way, at the highest level of abstraction, in fact. We call that highest level a model; it shows the major boxes and arrows, and at least implies flow, collaboration and communication among the boxes. Constructs are what we call the constituents or components of our mental model. “Morale” is an example of a construct, so is “resistance to change.”  These are the names we have invented of collections of properties of things we may have invented. Con¬structs are   m a d e    up of things that can take on values, variables. If I want to say something about an instance of a construct, such as how high morale is or how much resistance to change there is, then I would collect data on the value of variables. I would analyze the collected data to ascertain if I could see any patterns, and then, based on what I infer from the patterns, I might take action.

给我们的直觉就是：有一种理论正漂浮于我的脑海之中，我以某种抽象的方式将它记载下来，事实上是在抽象的最高层。我们称这个最高层为模型；它表示主要的框架和指向，最起码这些框架意味着流程、协作与交流。构建就是我们说的组成或我们精神模型的组成。“信念/士气？”就是构建的一个例子，它是“阻碍变革”的代名词。我们发明的这些事物属性的集合也许早己有之。构建是由能表明值与变量的种种事物组合而成的。如果我想举例说明构建的话，如士气有多高，对于变革的阻力有多大，也就是，我会收集变量的值的相关数据。我会分析收集到的数据来决定我是否能看出一些模式，然后我可能会对从这些模式中推理出来的东西采取行动。

Here is an example to illustrate the use of theory. Ever notice that there is great excitement when a new leader is announced, such as CEO, or Chairperson, or President? We all rally around that person and then, usually slowly, perhaps ineluctably, we part ways with the new leader and begin to form a coalition to depose the new leader. The shine is off, the honeymoon is over. In fact, this seems to happen even with new (improvement) initiatives, such as TQM, Six Sigma, and, dare I say, CMM. Is it just my imagination, or does it always seem to happen?

这里有一个例子可用以阐明理论的使用。以往只要一有新领导被任命，像什么CEO、董事长或总载，我们就会兴奋得不得了。我们都围着他。然后，通常慢慢地、不可避免地，我们中部分人形成一个联盟来踢除这位领导。没有了明媚的阳光，蜜月也随之消逝。 事实上即使再来一次还会如此，就像TQM（全面质量管理）、Six Sigma(六西格玛)，我敢说还有CMM（能力成熟度模型）。它只是我的假想，还是它似乎总会发生？

The answer is in (Bion, Experiences in Groups, and Other Papers, 1961) : all groups elect or appoint a leader and then try to kill her/him because he/she does not meet our unstated, unlimited, infantile wishes. This applies to the leader of an organization and to a leader of an initiative, like software process improve¬ment. The lesson for me is that it’s not personal, and I really appreciate that there is a theory I can read and come to understand that will explain what happens in all groups. Incidentally, the really astonishing revela¬tion to me is that this happens in work groups and in therapy groups!

答案就在Bion1961年出版的《团队的经验及其它论文》中：所有团队选举或任命一个领导而后再将其“斩杀”，因为他（她）不
能满足我们没有明确说明的、无条件的、幼稚的希望。这同样适用于一个组织的领导及有首创精神的领导，就像软件过程改进。这个教训对我来说不是个人的，我非常感谢一种理论，读了它后，我开始明白了一点，这我稍后会解释的：在所有团队里会发生什么。还有，真正令我感到农业惊讶的是：这种也会发生在工作组和医疗组！

Why have or use theories? For me the reason is that my brain is small, I cannot remember very much, so having a shorthand for a really big thing – such as Bion’s theory on how all groups work – is helpful to me. It is a parsimonious representation of a possibly complex thing. Other reasons include the ability to predict the future (where the billiard ball – or missile – will be in a few minutes), see things I didn’t know mattered (the spin on the billiard ball), and deepen my under¬standing of how interaction takes place (the angle of inci¬dence is equal to the angle of reflection).

为什么存在或使用那些理论呢？对我来说理由就是我的大脑很小，我不能记住很多，因此对于大事情用速记法－就像Bion的所有的团队如何工作的理论－这对我来说受益匪浅。这就是以简约来代表可能地复杂的事情。其它的理由就是包括种种能力：对未来的预知（台球或导弹接下来几分钟会在哪儿），明白我不知道是什么一回事儿的东西（像台球的旋转），及加深我对交互是如何产生的（入射角等于反射角）。

Why don’t more of us use theories? Why isn’t there a track at the SEPG conferences on the theory of imple¬mentation? After all, we are all trying to implement process improvements. I think (Thorngate, "In General" Vs. "It Depends": Some Comments of the Gergen-Schlenker Debate, 1976) has put his finger on it. He says that a theory (model, framework, etc.) cannot simultaneously be general, accurate, and simple, which is depicted in Figure 2.

为什么我们中使用理论的人不多？为什么不会在SEPG会议上存在基于实施的理论陷井？毕竟，我们都在尝试着实现过程改进。我认为Thorngate1976年出版的《“一般情况”VS“具体情况”：Gergen-Schlenker辩论的一些评论》己经指明这点。他说，一种理论（模型、框架，等等）不能同时达到一般化，精确及简单，就像下图描述的那样：
                        
Figure 2.  Thorngate’s one-armed clock. (Adapted from Thorngate, 1976, p. 406)
图2.Thorngate的只有一个指针的钟（摘自Thorngate,1976，406页）

What I see at SEPG conferences is that some people are disappointed in theories, claiming that they are not general enough, or simple enough, or accurate enough. But, of course, any one theory cannot be all of those at once. It is a comfort to know that. In fact, we can select theories that best suit our usage, if they exist.

我在SEPG议会上看到的是有些人对理论很失望，声称它们不够一般化或不够简明或不够精确。但是，当然没有一种理论马上可以在同时囊括所有这些。知道这些令人很安慰。事实上，我们能够选择最适合我们使用的理论，如果它存在的话。

Some people at SEPG conferences have suggested that organizations are like families and we can fruitfully apply a theory of families to the organizations in which we are trying to improve software processes. This raises the question of generality: are family theories sufficiently general to apply to our industrial, non-profit, and gov¬ernmental organizations? What is the equivalent of the “parental role” in our organizations? Does that make sense in the theory we already have in our minds of how our organizations work? Is the purpose of a family suffi¬ciently like the purpose of our organizations to be able to make the link, or does purpose not matter?

SEGP会议上，有些人建议 ：团体就像家庭一样，我们能富有成效地将家庭理论应用于团体中，就依这点我们可以尝试来改进软件过程。这就产生了一个普遍性的问题：家庭论是完全地一般化，可应用于我们的产业，非赢利机构及政府组织中？那用什么来等同于企业中的“双亲角色”呢？这样做对于己存在于我们脑海中企业如何运作的那种理论有意义吗？家庭的目的和团体的目的能够充分地挂上钩吗，或者是目的不重要？

This brings us to the related question of “unit of analysis.” If my brain is small, I want a theory that works for the stuff I am dealing with so that I don’t have to tinker with (that is, personally extend) the theory. If I am dealing with the origin of the universe I may not want to use a theory about the start of life on Earth. Here is a table of the units we might be dealing with and their corresponding fields of study:

这就给我们带来另一个问题：“单元分析”。如果我的大脑很小，我希望有一种理论可以满足于我所处理的事情，那样我就不用胡乱地修改（即：个人扩充）这种理论这了。如果我正在处理宇宙的起源，我想我不会去使用什么地球生命起源的理论了。这里有一个单元表，它可能是我们会处理到的和它们相关的研究领域。

           

           

If we as SEPG members are dealing with collectives – groups, teams, organizations, companies, subsidiaries, divisions, subcontractors, branches, offices, etc. – then it might be beneficial to look at theories of social systems, the subject matter of sociology. Luckily for us, there is at least one such theory, Talcott Parsons’ General Theory of Action.

如果我们的SEPG成员在与各种集体打交道－团队、小组、组织、公司、子公司、部门、转包商、分支机构、事务处，等等－那么这就有益于看等社会系统的理论了，社会学的题材。对我们来说比较幸运的是至少还有这么一种理论：TalcottParsons的“行为的一般理论”。

Talcott Parsons is the most famous American 20th century sociologist. He tried to create a grand unified theory, like the one physicists are searching for. The good news is that he was a prolific writer and he wrote thousands of pages on his theory, and thousands more were written by others about it: the theory is accessi¬ble. The bad news is that Parsons’ style was “thick” and difficult to understand. The best entry point to the Theory of Action is (Bluth, Parsons' General Theory of Action: a Summary of the Basic Theory, 1982); for a critique of how difficult it is to understand Parsons directly, see (Black, The Social Theories of Talcott Par¬sons, 1961); for a bibliography of Parsons’ work see (Turner, The Talcott Parsons Reader, 1999); for a frame¬work that places Parsons into a larger fabric, see (Burrell & Morgan, Sociological Paradigms and Organ¬isational Analysis : Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life, 1979) and (Van de Ven & Poole, Explaining Development and Change in Organizations, 1995). And there is an attempt to provide a deduc¬tive logic framework for the theory in (Brownstein, Talcott Parsons' General Theory of Action: an Investiga¬tion of Fundamental Principles, 1982).

Talcott Parsons 是20世纪最有名的一位社会学家。他试着创造出一种大统的理论，就像那个时代的物理学家们寻求的一样。好消息是他是个多产的作家。他写了成千上万页关于他的理论的稿子，还有许多是由其它人完成的：这个理论还是可理解的。坏消息是Parsons的风格是“厚重”且十分难懂。最佳的切入点是行动理论（Bluth, Parsons' General Theory of Action: a Summary of the Basic Theory, 1982）；关于Parson的作品如何难懂的，可以看看（Black, The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons, 1961¬），关于Parsons作品的参考目录可以看看（Turner, The Talcott Parsons Reader, 1999），对于架构而言，把Parsons联系到较大的组织，可以看看（Burrell & Morgan, Sociological Paradigms and Organ¬isational Analysis : Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life, 1979）和（Van de Ven & Poole, Explaining Development and Change in Organizations, 1995）。还有人尝试为这个理论提供一种推理逻辑，见（Brownstein, Talcott Parsons' General Theory of Action: an Investiga¬ tion of Fundamental Principles, 1982）。

His theory of social systems looks like this:

他的社会系统理论如下：

(Adaptation:适应，Goal Attainment: 实现目标，Integration:合成，Latent Pattern Maintenance:潜在模式维护。)
           
Figure 3  Model of Parsons’ General Theory of Action. (AGIL framework)
图3   Parsons 的一般行为理论。（AGIL 框架）

External energy begins the clockwise flow, into Adaptation. Parsons postulated that there were four pre¬req¬uisites that every organization has to address in order to survive and flourish:
1. Adaptation, the interface with the outside environment, scans for “interesting” items and takes in energy, usually in the form of new ideas, and if those ideas are worthwhile (that is, consistent with the behavior patterns of the organization) then
2. Set goals and allocate resources accordingly.
3. Based on the goals and resource allocation, integrate new processes into the behavior.
4. Maintain the patterns of behavior in the organization. This is often called “culture” at SEPG confer¬ences.  The term “latent” means hidden, unseen.

外部力量开始以顺时针流处Adaptation。Parsons 假定有四个首要条件，每个想要存活和兴旺的组织都得解决这些问题。
1. 适应性，外部环境的接口，扫描感兴趣的条目并以饱满的热情来行动，通常 是新想法的形式，如果这些想法有价值（即与组织的行为模式相一致），那么
2. 从而设定目标和资源的分配。
3. 基于目标和资源分配，集成新的过程到行为体。
4. 维护组织中的行为模式。就是我们在SEPG会议上常说的“文化”。术语“latent”意味着隐藏的，不可见的。

The arrangement of the four prerequisites (that’s what the boxes are called: functional prerequisites) is the static structure, and the arrows among them are the dynamic exchange of information among the prerequi¬sites, which instantiates how each of the four boxes interacts with the others. In fact, the latent pattern main¬tenance one is different, special, as it impacts the rest of the boxes by forming the filter that lets in – or does not let in – the energy that travels clockwise around the circuit. In a sense, latent pattern maintenance tries to restore the organization to its form before being “disturbed” by the new ideas. Parsons likened latent pattern maintenance to the law of physics that for every disturbing force there is an equal and opposite restoring force.

这四个首要条件（这些条条框框称之为：功能性首要条件）的安排是一 个静态的结构，这些箭头是这些条件之间信息的动态变更，它显示着这四个框架如何与彼此互交的。事实上，这个潜在的模式维护是不同的、特殊的，因为它影响着其余的框架（通过形成一种过滤器来决定让围绕这个圈顺时针游走的外力进还是不让进。在某种意义上，潜在的模式维护尝试着在被新的思想“搅乱”之前恢复组织本来的形式。Parsons 将潜在的模式维护比作物理定律（对于每个干扰力总存在一个同等大小并相反力道的回恢力。）

When I look at organizations I ask myself how each of the four prerequisites are being met and whether the interchange among them is operating. That is, the Parsons framework can be directly used for organizational diagnosis and then action can be couched in terms of what the theory anticipates and expects. It’s the ulti¬mate of practicality!

每当我看到这些组织，我就会问自己如何让这四个先决条件得到满足且它们之间的互交是否是可操作的。即：Parsons架构能否直接用于组织的诊断之中及按照理论预测和期望的方式来行动。这也就是最终的实用性了！

I am going to say quite a bit about resistance to change in section VIII. As a preview, what do you think Par¬sons would say about resistance to change? He would say that it is a vital, fundamental function (latent pat¬tern maintenance) and if it didn’t work then the organization would suffer and die.
So, how do you know how to evaluate suggestions that come your way? Ask if they are consistent with a/the theory you are using.

我将会在第八节讲述许多关于变革阻力的东西。先提一点，你认为Parsons 对于变革阻力会说些什么呢？它会说这是至关重要的，根本性的功能（潜在的模式维护）并且如果它不能工作，这个组织将会痛苦不堪甚至消亡。
那么，你如何知道应该如何评估出现在面前的那些建议呢？试问他们是否与你正在使用的理论相一致呢！

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译者权归“思步网（www.step365.com）”及版主“一啸长天”共同所有，未经许可，请勿转载

sunny

Surrender  tks..

一啸长天

V.        
Too much “one size fits all”

The mood at the SEI when we were writing the Guide was that organizations lacked the backbone to make changes, that they needed strong words to encourage – well, force – them to see the value in the improve¬ments we were espousing. We had to be unequivocal in our guidance, no room for argument or discussion. We had to be directive, powerful, and unwavering.

当时我们正在SEI编写SEPG指南，此时的境况是：那些组织缺少中坚力量来变革，他们需要强劲的呼吁――那好，要让他们看到我们在所支持的改进中取得的战果！我们不能在指南中有任何的含糊其词，不给任何的可讨论或辩论的空间。我一定要做到直接、强劲、不可动摇！

This is in contradistinction to what social systems “engineers” call equifinality: there are many ways to reach objectives. It’s taken on faith that there are many means possible to achieve goals, that the most important dis¬tinction is not to confuse ends and means.

这里所对比的是那些社会体制的“工程师们”所倡导的等效：有很多方法可以达到目标。这是相信有很多方法可以达到目标，最重要的区别是不要混淆了目标和手段。

In that spirit, I will never forget a presentation Dave Card   m a d e   at an early SEPG conference. He showed how his division had accomplished all of the functions of an SEPG, but different internal entities did them: the functions were distributed. There was not one dedicated group, but rather the functions were integrated into mostly-existing structures. That was heresy at the SEI, and the standard response to predict failure because there was not enough management commitment to centralize the resources. Parsons, on the other hand, would have rated the chances of success as very high because it was a style of integration (one of the four functional prerequisites), a reward for using what already worked and increasing the scope of that to encompass the next great thing.

同样，我永远都不会忘记Dave Card 在早期的SEPG会议上所陈述的内容。他给我们展示了他的部门己经完成了SEPG里面所含盖的所有功能，但是不同的本质性的东西实现了他们：这些功能点都是分散的。没有一个专注的团队，而是这些功能都被集成到己存在的结构中。这在SEI来说，是另类的，而且这种标准注定了失败，因为没有足够的管理层的承诺来集中资源。换句话说，Parsons可能己经给予了这种成功的变革很高的评价，因为它是集成的一种方式（四大功能首要条件之一），这是对使用己存在的可行的东西及持续扩展下一个重大的事物的奖励。

I used to sponsor a “One size does not fit all” panel at SEPG conferences, but program committees evidently grew tired of them and the proposals were never again accepted. Panel members proved, at least to me, that what worked in a large, centralized, command and control corporation like Boeing or IBM was unlikely to work in a small, flat, democratic, techie company like Ashton-Tate. We had speakers from defense and civilian agencies, defense contractors, metal benders, commercial computer providers, and software houses. No two were alike in how they organized, paid for, justified, or operated their SEPGs. Clearly, one size did not fit all.

我过去常常在SEPG会议上倡议“没有万能的钥匙”，但是计划委员会的人们很明显越来越厌恶这个了，这个提案终于都不会被再接受了。小组成员证明，至少对我来说，那种运作的大型、集中、可支配和控制的公司（像Boeing 或 IBM），是不同于那种小型、平行分布、民主的技术公司（像 Ashton-Tate）。我们有一些来自国防和民间机构、国防项目承包商、金属供销者、商业计算机供应商及一些软件公司的演说者。

But what I can borrow from what I hear or read, given that no two organizations may be the same? That is a set tled question, by a field called contingency theory. Contingency theory asks, “What is the best way to organize?” and answers with “It depends.” “Depends on what?” you ask. It depends upon a set of factors that have been theoretically and empirically shown to make a difference. The best description of contingency theory and what it means to say that one organization is like another is (Burton & Obel, Strategic Organiza tional Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for Application, 1998).

但是我能从所见所闻里借见一些什么呢，假定没有两个组织是一样的？这是己由所谓权变理论解决的问题。权变理论中提出，“组织的最好方式是什么呢？”答案就是：“依赖一些东西。”“依赖什么？”你不禁会问道。它依赖于一系列己经被理论和经验证明的因素来起作用。权变理论的最佳论述和它说一个组织与另一个是相像的，这就是（Burton & Obel, Strategic Organiza  tional Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for Application, 1998）。

Some organizations have had trouble getting software process improvement started. The accepted wisdom is that that is caused by a lack of sponsorship, that those who print money do not see the (true, obvious) value in SPI. They are deluded, bad characters. I have found the contrary, that SPI as dictum in the CMMs is det rimental to many organizations: it is contrary to their value proposition to the marketplace. Those organiza tions have to perform SPI by stealth, not because of lack of will, but rather because it is the most effective and most appropriate way.

一些组织在软件过程改进的开始就己经遇到了一些麻烦了。公认的看法是这是由于缺乏赞助而造成的，就是在SPI里只知道钱但不管价值（真值，很明显）。他们是受了蛊惑的坏角色。我发现正相反，在CMMs里把SPI做为至理名言对很多组织来说是有害的：即有背于他们对市场的价值观。那些组织只能偷偷地来执行SPI，不是因为缺乏意愿，而是这样做是最有效且最适合的方式。

The logic comes from (Treacy & Wiersema, The Discipline of Market Leaders; Choose Your Customers, Nar row Your Focus, Dominate Your Market, 1995), a study of 80 high performing firms. The authors ask “What was the secret to their success?” and answer with “Focus,” but that is not new. Digging deeper they found that highly successful organizations focused on one and only one value proposition or market disci pline”

这种逻辑来自于（Treacy & Wiersema, The Discipline of Market Leaders; Choose Your Customers, Nar row Your Focus, Dominate Your Market, 1995），这是对80家高性能公司的研究。其作者提出“他们成功的密决是什么？”，而答案就是“专”，但这不是什么新概念了。深入后，他们发现非常成功的组织专注于一点及一种价值观或市场规律。

Operational excellence – lowest price because it has the lowest cost, usually because it has the high est quality for its category. Process innovator, no product innovation. Short menu, “formula” for the delivery of goods or services. Examples: FedEx, McDonald’s, Wal-Mart, semiconductor manufactur ers.
Product innovation – emphasizes new features. Measures its success by number of patents, Nobelists, or turns in the marketplace. Examples: Sony, Intel, Lucent, every pharmaceutical development com pany.
Customer intimacy – will do anything for a client, offers one-stop shopping, the total solution. Infi nite menu. Examples: Big Five accounting firms, Computer Sciences Corp.

1. 卓越的运营－最低价格原为它有着最低成本，这通常是原于因合理的部署而有着高质量。对过程的创新，而非对产品。短期选择，给货物配送或服务定一个规则。例：联邦快递、麦当劳、桥尔玛、半导体厂商。
2. 产品创新－强调新的功能。权衡它的成功是以专利申请的数量、诺贝尔奖得主的人数或市场的回报。例：索尼、英特尔、朗讯、每一个药品研发公司。
3. 与顾客无间－为客户做任何事情，提供一应俱全的购物，全套解决方案。无限的选择。例：五大会计事务所，计算机科学公司（美国）。

Treacy and Wiersema are quick to point out that while high performance organizations concentrate on one and only one discipline, every organization has to perform at a threshold level on the disciplines that it is not focusing on. That is important in the case of traditional, CMM-centric software process improvement because it is specifically for operationally excellent organizations, organizations that differentiate themselves in the marketplace by their quality. The other two disciplines only have to reach a threshold level of opera tional excellence, and the CMM is silent about process areas that would specifically help product innovative and customer intimate organizations beyond the threshold level.

Treacy 和 Wiersema 迅速指出当那些高性能组织专注于有且仅有一个 规范 ，每个组织能得在基于其它没有被专注的规范的一个阀值处运转。这在传统情况里是很重要的，CMM软件过程改进的中心，因为它对于那些运营很出色的组织来说是很明确的，那些组织是靠在市场上以品质来区分彼此的。另外的两个规范只能达到卓越运营的一个阀值，CMM在过程领域是冷静的，这样很有助于产品创新和客户亲密组织超越阀值。

Therefore, it is appropriate for product innovative and customer intimate organizations to achieve “just enough” process improvement, and perhaps to do even that by stealth as a way to take clear aim on the dominant strategy of the organization. So, some leaders are precisely correct in not embracing SPI: it was inappropriate as a goal for two out of the three disciplines. They were not bad characters, as we accused them, rather they had a sense that while more quality was better, that was not what drove their organizations; the marketplace expected something different, and SPI would not directly deliver that.

因此，这样对于产品创新和客户亲密组织以达到“足够”过程改进是比较适合的，可能只是悄悄地进行，作为一种手段对于组织的主导战略采取明确的目标。因此，一些领导明确改正不接受SPI的做法：以其中两条作为规范是不合适的。他们并不是坏的角色。与其将责任归咎于他们，不如让其产生提高质量的观念，虽然这不是经营好组织的关键因素。商业界期望一些与众不同的东西，而SPI并不会直接表达这种观点。

More details on the connection between The Discipline of Market Leaders and SPI can be found in (Rifkin, What Makes Measuring Software So Hard?, May/June 2001).

更多关于市场领导规范与SPI间的联系可参考Rifkin 的What Makes Measuring Software So Hard。


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一啸长天

VI.        
Not enough about patterns of adoption

对有关采用的模型没有充分的了解


There are many synonyms for getting new processes into practice or new products into our lives: deploy¬ment, implementation, technology transfer, technology transition, technology diffusion, and adoption. They all mean changing the way we work or what we buy/use.

在实践中注入新工序或将新产品投入到我们的生活中有很多同义语：部署、执行、技术让渡、技术转变、技术普及以及采用率。它们意味着我们工作方式或使用器具的改变。

A. Diffusion of innovations     新发明的普及
One of the pioneers in seeing a pattern in how processes and products are adopted is Everett Rogers. He col¬lects stories of adoption and has assembled the fruits of that collection in (Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 1995). He reports that adop¬tion often follows this pattern:

Everett Rogers 是研究有关新过程、新产品如何被采用的模型的先驱之一。他搜集相关方面的故事案例。并将成果汇集于Diffusion of Innovations，他在报告中指出采用比例符合以下模型：

The S-shaped curve has along it the names of the groups of people who adopt at different epochs in the life cycle. Suffice it to say that the model is one of a communication process (or contagion) where the message of the value of the new process or product is diffused from adopter to adopter. Informally, adoption by an organi¬zation as a whole is declared when about 50% of the people use it commonly. That is, it is the way to do things in about half of the projects, and the usage is increasing.

S型曲线上标有整个生命周期中不同阶段的使用人群组的名称。认同模型的人认为它是一种交流过程  （我只想说，这个模型是交流过程（或传播）的一种），即新过程或新产品的价值传播于采用者之间的交流过程。非正式地讲，当申明整体被一个组织采用，且采用率达50%    （总体上讲，被组织所采纳的方案当它的使用率普及到50%的时候，它就会被声明。这就是说，在到达半期工程时是时候做些什么了，而且它的采用率也增加了。

One of the inspirations for the S-shape is logistic or Gompertz growth, which occurs when there is a growing population that is dependent upon a fixed resource (think bacteria in a Petri dish, real estate in Pittsburgh, and the number of people who can adopt a new process in an organization). S-shapes in the context of diffu¬sion of innovations have been criticized because they only predict increased adoption. For a counter-argu¬ment, see (Chaddha & Chitgopekar, A "Generalization" of the Logistic Curves and Long-Range Forecasts (1966-1991) of Residence Telephones, Autumn 1971), which tried to explain why Picturephone failed to become adopted. Also, the S-shaped curve depicts the cumulative adoption; the sum of the normal distribu¬tion is also S-shaped, which will be handy to know as we explore …

鼓舞人心的是S型符合logistic或Gompertz growth，成立条件是:增长的人口依赖于即定的资源（可以想象器皿碟里的细菌、匹兹堡真正有地位的人、一个组织中会采用新工序的人数）在“新发明的普及”文中S型被批评它只是预测了采用百分比的增长。有关辩论请参看：（书名），它试图解释了为什么此曲线不适用于电视电话。另外，S型曲线描述的是渐增的采用百分比，自然传播的总量也符合S 型，这在我们以后的开发中是便利可取的。

B. Crossing the Chasm   凹槽间的衔接
The literature on adoption is filled with responses and rebuttals to Rogers’ pioneering work. The most color¬ful may be (Moore, Crossing the Chasm: Marketing and Selling Technology Products to Mainstream Custom¬ers, 1991). He rewrites the adoption curve as:
Roger有关采用的著作的先驱探索中充满了响应与反驳，最精彩的或许就是（书名） ，他重新描述的采用曲线如下：

Figure 4. Pattern of adoption according to Crossing the Chasm, p. 17.

Basically, there are chasms or deep valleys between each epoch, between each class of adopter. And there is a particularly deep one between early adopter and early majority, where SEPGs try to operate once SPI gets rolling in an organization. Accordingly, Moore’s work is both entertaining and informative.
大致来说，各时期、各阶层的采用者间会有裂口或深的凹槽，其中早期采用者与前期过半段之间的凹槽最深，此处SPI曾经在组织中引起波动，SEPG试图进行操作。因此，Moore 的工作是有趣而又有教育价值的。

So, which is more accurate, Rogers, Moore, or others (e.g., (Tornatzky & Fleischer, The Process of Technologi¬cal Innovation, 1990), that says it’s all more complicated than a simple communication process)? As a contingency theorist, I would respond, “It depends.” First, it depends upon whether adoption is primar¬ily a matter of communication. To the extent it is, as in health and safety issues, then I find in my practice that Rogers’ model is fine. If, rather than a communications process it is a selling process, then I find that Moore is more informative. But, when there are many competing ways to perform a new process, then I find Tornatzky to be more predictive of what I see. Another answer would be to follow the International Federa¬tion for Information Processing (IFIP) working group 8.6 (e.g., (Levine, Diffusion, Transfer and Implementa¬tion of Information Technology, 1994), which reports on a 1993 conference held at the SEI), http://www.indiana.edu/~ifip86/, which is trying to sort out these and other related issues, particularly as they relate to the adoption of software process improvement.

因此，哪种模型更精确，是Rogers的还是Moore或是其他的（ 象是Tornatzky 和Fleischer的《技术创新过程》 其中疑问它比任何简单的交流过程都将复杂？），作为一个权变理论者，我的回答是“这得看情况”。首先，它得看采用是交流的主要事件。某中程度上讲，如同健康安全出口，我在实践中发现Roger 的模型是较好的，说是交流过程不如说是销售过程。其次，我发现Moore 更具有教育价值。但是，当产生许多新的竞争途径来完成一种新过程时 ，我发现Tornatzky的更具有预见性。另一种回答将跟随IFIP工作组


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xinxijie531

真的很棒哦,支持你哦,继续努力哈...

一啸长天

VII.        
Too much psychology, not enough sociology



Psychology addresses the wrong unit of analysis for our work. It is focused on the individual, but we cannot afford to help organizations change one person at a time. We should be focused on organizations, so we should be learning about sociology. Unfortunately for us, psychology does not scale up to sociology. They are not just on different scales, they are different.

心理学用于指出我们工作中的错误分析单元。它聚焦于个人，但是我们不能每一次去帮助那些企业改变某个人。我们应专注于企业，因糨我们应该了解社会学。对我们来说不幸的是，心理学作用不能扩容至等于社会学效应。它们的作用范畴不同，他们是截然不同的 。
A. Myths due to psychology       归因于心理学的一些误区。

Here are three myths about groups that we have inherited from psychology:

以下是我们从心理学里遗留下的与团队有关的一些误区。

1. Myth: Teams need to be goal-aligned
Wrong. It is sufficient to be means-aligned. We do not have to agree on a common goal to work as a team, we only have to agree on how to achieve the end. (Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing, 1979)

1. 误区：队员们需要目标一致
错。这只能使大家产生分歧。我们作为一个小组没有必要强调工作的同共目标，我们只要能在最终的成果上能达成共识即可。（Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing, 1979）

The standard example is any US professional football team. Each person is on the team for a different reason. Some for the money, some for fame or glory, some because it’s what they do best, some because they don’t know what else to do. There are many reasons, many personal goals. But they all agree on the play¬book. It’s what they practice, what they expect from each other, no matter how dis¬parate and even competing their individual goals may be.

一个典型的例子是美国专业足球队。每个人怀揣着不同的原因。有的是为了金钱，有的是为了名誉，有的是因为这是他们做得最好的，有的则是他们不知道他们除了这还能做好什么。原因太多了，也太多的个人目标了。但是他们有着同样一个剧本。这是需要他们共同演绎的，他们寄希望于彼此，不管他们的分歧有多大，甚至可能与他们的个人目标相冲突。

This would work with our software and systems development teams. We can agree on the playbook, even though we do not agree on the goals for our individual and collective work. In our case the playbook is the organization’s defined process. To think that processes come from places other than collectively-agreed goals is considered heresy to most SEPG members, primarily because we are crippled by psychology think¬ing.

这也同样适用于我们的软件和系统开发团队。我们能对剧本怀揣一致态度，甚至我们在个人目标和集体工作的看法不一致。对于我们来说，这个剧本就是组织定义的过程。想想那些过程来自于不同的地方肯定不同于集体商定的目标，这被认为是异教对于大多数的SEPG成员来说，主要是因为我们被心理学思想阻挠着。

2.        Myth: Teams form, storm, norm, and then perform   小队的 形成，波动，规范，行动

There are a lot of pages used to describe the phases a team goes through to get its work done. Most of it is   m a d e   up. No theory, alas. A UCLA researcher went to study, really to validate, the form, storm, norm, per¬form phases that we have all learned (well, memorized). She was not exactly unbiased and open, she was going to study those four phases. She was a bit sur¬prised, and even frustrated, that the work teams she stud¬ied did not go through those phases at all, so she studied some more. What she found is that the teams she observed went through two phases: the first in which the members discuss roles and responsibilities, and team proc¬esses, like decision-making and assignments and progress reporting. Then the halfway mark comes and the team panics because it has not accomplished anything, so it jumps into the second phase: heads-down work performance. (Gersick, Time and Transition in Work Teams: Toward a New Model of Group Devel¬opment, 1988)

有很多文档来描述一些短语，这些如何穿帮助小组完成他们的工作。它们很多是拼凑起来的。唉呀，没有任何的理论支持！一位UCLA的研究员着手研究（真正地去验证）形成，波动，规范，行动等此类我们己熟知的短语。他没有完全的公正、公开，她将着手研究这四个短语。她有点惊讶于（甚至有点受挫）那些工作团队没有一点是遵循这四个原则的，于是她进行了更深入的研究。她的研究表明她所观察的那些小组都进行着两个阶段：第一，成员们讨论角色和职责分配,还有小组过程,像决策、任务分配、进度报告。然后半路上出了岔子，小组就开始痛苦起来了，因为没有完成任何东西，因此跳到第二阶段：降低工作性能。（Gersick, Time and Transition in Work Teams: Toward a New Model of Group Devel¬opment, 1988）

There is another explanation I like, too, and very steeped in theory, particularly by Bion. In fact, you don’t have to read Bion directly if you read this (Smith & Berg, Paradoxes of Group Life: Understanding Conflict, Paralysis, and Movement in Group Dynamics, 1987) instead. The authors observe that teams progress until they get stuck! The authors see that teams have to address a series of issues and unless and until they do, they do not make progress. The issues are paradoxes, problems that by their nature are contradictory and cannot have a single answer.

还有一种解释我也比较喜欢，而且沉浸于这种理论之中，特别是Bion的。实事上，如果你读过这个（Smith & Berg, Paradoxes of Group Life: Understanding Conflict, Paralysis, and Movement in Group Dynamics, 1987），就不用再去看Bion的了。这些作者发现那些小组只有在遇到荆棘时才会进行改进。这些作者看到那些小组标出一系列的问题并且除非出现这些问题，他们是不会去做改进的。这些问题都是自相矛盾的，问题出于它们本质上是矛盾的对立体并且不会有一个唯一的解答的！

Here is an example. A configuration management (CM) working group has defined the new CM process, but will not release it for trial use. The SEPG is trying every method of persuasion it has, but so far to no avail. What is the problem, why/how is the group stuck? Members of the working group are not satisfied that the process description is good (perfect) enough, and they would be embarrassed by their peers if they released a flawed process, it would discredit their standing as experts. But, of course, you cannot tell if it’s flawed or not until it is released and tried in the field. So, one must not release it, but one also must. An SEPG member versed in paradoxes will see that it, along with all paradoxes, is a framing issue. The issue cannot remain per¬fection because that cannot become known inside the working group meetings; the process would never be released with that criterion and method of determination. Rather, the criterion has to be shifted to “engineer satisfaction,” so that the path forward is to release the process and then quickly respond to flaws discovered in use.

这里有一个例子。一个配置管理工作团队己经定义好了新的CM过程，但是不会发布它以试用。SEPG正在尝试每一种可以说服（他们）的方法，但至今为止无一幸免。问题是什么，这些团队为什么/如何会碰到荆棘？工作团队的成员们都不满于几近乎完美的过程描述，并且他们会被他们的同类所拥护如果他们发布了一个有缺陷的过程，这将有损他们做为专家的立场。但是，当然如果它有缺陷你也不能讲明，除非它被发布并且服役于所在领域。由此可见，一方必须禁止发布，而另一方必须发布。一个SEPG成员熟知这些矛盾，也会看出伴随着这些矛盾的是一种结构性问题。这个问题不能保持完美，因为它不能在工作团队会议里被认知；这个过程将永远不会被发布，如果以标准和评测的方法来衡量的话。这样的话，所谓的标准就得改成“工程师满意度”了，因此前面的路应该是发布这个过程并且一经在使用中发现缺陷立即响应！

3.        Myth: Knowing the personality type is helpful   了解人性类型是大有裨益的

At SEPG conferences the most common method I see advocated to know the personality of another person is the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), a variant, some say perversion , of Jung’s idea that we are born with certain proclivities and they are manifest in our choices, in our behavior. The Type Indicator is a four-letter code out of 24 possibilities, which is too many for my small brain. No problem: 85% of the people in computing are INTJ.

在SEPG会议上,我看到的最普遍的被拥护的方法是去了解另一个人的人性,这就是所谓的曼布二姓氏类型指标(MBTI),一个变体,有些人说这是误用。Jung的思想是我们在出生时就带有一种特定的倾向并且它们在我们做出选择、动作的时候表现出来。这种类型测试符是有24种可能性的四字母码的组合，这对于我这“袖珍“型的脑袋来说太多了。没关系：85%的人都被计算出属于INTJ类型。

But here is the problem. I have scoured the MBTI literature for even a single research article that, armed with the Type Indicators of the participants, predicts the behavior of a group. None found. In other words, to exaggerate, you can know all about the psychological composition of your teammates and never be able to predict what will happen when they all come together to act as a group. Personality type indicator is the wrong unit of analysis. What is the personality type of people who overuse personality types: JDGI, Just Don’t Get It.

然而还是存在着问题。我翻阅了MBTI文献，甚至是一份单独研究的文章，携带着参与者的类型测试指标，可用以预测一个团队的行为。但尚无发现此类现象。换句话说，夸张一点吧，你能够知道你的队员们的心理成份，但是永远都不能预测到他们组成一个团队后会发生什么。个性类型指标是个分析的错误单元。那些过度使用人性类型的人们的人性类型是怎样的:JDGI,千万别染指。

No, we need to learn more about social systems (sociology) and let that knowledge naturally replace what we have learned about individuals acting individually. And you would think that books like (Hohmann, Journey of the Software Professional: a Sociology of Software Development, 1997) would help, but there’s actually no sociology in it.

不，我们需要了解更多关于社会体制,并且使得此类知识能自然取代我们孤立的对个体的研究。并且你将知道像（Hohmann Journey, of the Software Professional: a Sociology of Software Development, 1997Journey）之类的书会有所帮助，但这里准确的说没有社会学参与其中。

漂在生活

一啸长天 真不是盖的，加根油条给你(zaijian:

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qq0866

(ding:楼主好强啊，感谢一下。

heroindream

希望你能坚持下去

一啸长天

14# heroindream

\(^o^)/~ 好说！哈哈！